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DICTA

May-June, 1955

NOTES AND COMMENTS
IN RE NEW TRIALS ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES ALONE*
In Volume 31, No. 4, the April 1954 edition of DICTA, there
appeared an article by Kenneth M. Wormwood entitled "New Trials
on the Issue of Damages Alone."
The viewpoints expressed by Mr. Wormwood, of course, represent one side of a controversial issue. The other side of this issue
appeared in a comment upon Mr. Wormwood's article which was
printed at 14 N.A.C.C.A. Law Journal, page 411, published in
November, 1954. The N.A.C.C.A. Edtior's comment was as follows:
The spirit and underlying purpose of this paper are
brought out in the opening line: "Only recently has the
general public awakened to a real danger affecting our
economic system today." Excessive verdicts, we are told,
"soon add up to a staggering total." The writer goes on:
"Insurance companies are now attempting to combat this
situation through an educational program such as advertisements calling the public's attention to the fact that
in the long run it is the individual citizen who pays the
bill through an increase in his insurance premiums. Magazines have now started to run articles attempting to
educate the public along this line." In other words, the
paper is part of a systematic propaganda against verdicts
awarding damages to the extent of full reparation of injuries suffered. One recent practice of the courts which
he considers a threat to our economic system is giving an
instruction advising the jury they may take into consideration the present purchasing power of the dollar.
But the supposed abuse to which the paper is chiefly directed is granting of new trials on the issue of damages
alone. We are referred in particular to Norfolk S. R. Co.
v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269, where Mr. Justice Lamar, in
an opinion affirming a judgment of a state court under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, in which a new
trial had been granted solely on the issue as to damages,
held that "splitting of the issue and granting a partial
new trial" did not deprive the defendant of a federal
right. Defendant had contended that the courts "should
not be permitted to administer the Employees' Liabliity
Act in piecemeal." But at this time the movement for
modernizing procedure and so, among other things, min* This comment is presented by Judge Omar E. Garwood, President of the
Association of Colorado Claimants' Attorneys which is affiliated with the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys.
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imizing the delay and expense of new trials, had little more
than begun and courts were suspicious of such things,
new to their experience, as new trials other than of cases
as a whole.
Hence Mr. Justice Lamar said obiter that the practice of new trial on the one issue was "not to be commended." The courts in this country had begun in the
present century to grant new trials on one issue, as had
been done already for a generation in England. But the
practice was taken over and established in America before
the era of large verdicts which so disturb the writer and
is part of the general simplification and improvement
of procedure of which the Federal Rules and the Rules
of Court in an increasing number of states today are
examples. It won't do today to say that the power to
limit a new trial to a particular issue is to be "exercised
with great caution." It is enough that if in a particular
case the court can see that the whole verdict should be
overturned for some error or infirmity affecting the verdict as a whole it should set the whole verdict aside.
The writer is troubled because the trend seems to be
that large verdicts by juries are generally not reversed
by the appellate court, whereas verdicts awarding inadequate damages are set aside and unfortunately new
trials are too often awarded on the issue of damages
alone. The process of wearing out an injured plaintiff
by repeated trials and appeals is to be preserved as a
safeguard of our economic system. A minimum of damages to be paid by the insurer is to weigh more than the
general security.
VAN SCHAACK & CO. V. PERKINS:' Liability of landlord
for dangerous conditions of the premises of which he had no notice.
This is an action in tort for personal injuries suffered by a
tenant resulting from the negligent act of an agent or servant of
the owner and operator of the building.
Plaintiff, a woman attorney who was 73 years of age, maintained an office in a building owned and operated by the defendant. She suffered a fractured humerus and other injuries from
a fall which occurred in a ladies' rest-room in the building at about
6:00 P.M. on a work day. Plaintiff brought this action claiming
damages for permanent disability, loss of earnings, and other
expenses.
Evidence admitted at the trial showed that the building janitor had left the ladies' rest-room to permit plaintiff to enter, and
upon leaving, had left a container with rest-room supplies and
an open-top can of liquid soap in the center of the floor of the
room. No soap was on the floor when the janitor left the supplies,
I Colorado Bar Association, Adv. Sheet 17303, Page 392 (June 28, 1954).
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but upon returning to aid plaintiff after her fall, he found the
soap container over-turned and the soap soaking plaintiff's skirt
as she lay on the floor. No person other than the plaintiff or janitor was in or near the rest-room during or immediately preceding
the mishap.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on which judgment
was entered by the trial court. Defendant brought the case to the
Supreme Court for review on a writ of error, contending the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission to a jury because
"it failed to establish defendant had any notice of the dangerous
condition prior to the injury"; was no more consistent with negligence on defendant's part than with due care; and was as indicative of negligence on plaintiff's part as of negligence on defendant's part. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on how to determine the "present
value of future decreased earning capacity" by taking into consideration the effect of any pre-existing disease and what the
"effect of the natural course of such disease would have on such
earning capacity." 2
The evidence showed that plaintiff was suffering from arteriosclerosis prior to the mishap, but this was a disease common to
persons over 50 years of age and not necessarily disabling. The
only concrete evidence on record concerning plaintiff's physical
condition prior to the mishap showed that she was in good health
for a woman of her age; that she was actually engaged in the practice of law; and that she had been making her living at it. Likewise, it was undisputed that, after the accident, plaintiff went into
physical and mental decline and had to retire from her profession
and hadn't worked since. Defendant produced no evidence to the
contrary, neither lay nor medical.
Two issues were presented for determination by the Supreme
Court:
1. Under the circumstances present, was it necessary for
plaintiff to prove the defendant, owner and operator of the
building, had actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition,
or that the condition existed for so long a time that they
would be charged with notice?
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to give an instruction tendered by counsel for defendant relative to the measure
of damages recoverable by plaintiff?
The Court, by unanimous decision, answered both of these
questions in the negative. It based its decision of the first question
on the rule of law as found in numerous cases which state "when
a landlord retains control of portions of building for the use and
benefit of all the tenants, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to keep these portions in safe condition for use of the ten2

tpra, note 1, P. 394.
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ants." 3 The holding on the second- question was an arbitrary one
in which the Court said "suffice it to say that our Court, to our
knowledge, never has held such an instruction executed in an action
for personal injuries involving lost future earnings. The jury could
only have been confused by that language." 4
The decision of this case holds in effect that owners of a
building do not need notice of an existing dangerous condition
before becoming liable for injuries to a tenant when the condition
was caused by the negligence of an agent. Furthermore, in an
action for personal injuries involving lost future earnings, it is
not essential that an instruction be given to determine the "present value of future decreased earning capacity."
There are numerous cases, in addition to those cited in the
Court's decision in this case, which support the Court's holding
as to the landlord's liability on varying theories.5 However, none
come clearly within the rule that "owners of a building do not need
notice of an existing dangerous condition before becoming liable
for injuries to a tenant when the condition was caused by the
negligent act of an agent."
The Louisiana Court of Appeals (1938) held in Thomas v.
Harmon, 178 So. 690, that unless an injured person occupies the
position of lessee or is otherwise lawfully on the premises, the
landlord is not liable for injuries sustained because of failure
to keep the premises in a safe condition.
In C. W. Simpson Co. v. Langley, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 365. 131
F. (2d) 869, it was held that the owner of an apartment building
owes a duty to those persons lawfully using approaches and entrances over which the owner has the right of control to exercise
ordinary care, after notice or reasonable opportunity for notice,
to keep them free from either temporary or permanent conditions
of danger. In Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Board Co., 148 Md. 16, 40
A. (2d) 43, it was held that a property owner must exercise care
that his property is so used and managed by his own servants or
by an independent contractor that the mode of conducting his work
will not cause injury to servants or others.
The case of Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., (Mo. Appeals),
115 S.W. (2d) 219, held that knowledge of the defect or danger
is not a necessary element of negligence where the act or omission,
in and of itself, involves a violation of duty where there is an
absolute duty on the owner or person in charge of the property
to keep it in a safe condition.
These cases establish the precedent that liability exists for
not keeping the premises in safe condition, and that notice or
I Robinson v. Belmont-Buckinghan Holding Co., 94 Colo. 534, 31 P. (2d) 918;
Frazier v. Edwards, 117 Colo. 502, 190 P. (2d) 126; Reiman v. Moore, 30 Cal.
App. (2d) 306, 86 P. (2d) 156; Simmons v. Pagones, 66 So. Dak. 296. 282 N.W.
257; Scibek v. O'Connell, 131 Conn. 557, 41 A. (2d) 251; Henry v. First Nat.
Bank of Kansas City, (Mo. Appeals), 115 S.W. (2d) 121; Butler v. Maney, 146
Fla. 33, 200 S. 226.
. Supra, note 1, P. 395.
129 Boston Law Review 423-6 (1949).
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knowledge are not necessary where an absolute duty is owed to
keep premises in a safe condition. No case prior to the principal
case appears to involve a situation with the additional element of
negligence on the part of an agent or servant. It would appear
that this point might have been argued on the basis of the doctrine
of respondeat superior since "a master is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the negligent conduct of servants within
the scope of employment," 0 and "janitors whose jobs are confined
to the performance of manual acts on the premises under the
owner's supervision come within the definition of a servant." 7
A number of cases appear to hold contra to the principal case,
although they are distinguishable. In those cases the obstruction
or element of danger does not appear to have been created or
caused by an agent or servant. For example, the case of Laflin v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co., 127 Conn. 61, 13 A. (2d) 760, held that
the owner of an apartment building was not liable for injuries
allegedly received by a tenant falling over a toy automobile on
a step at the outer entrance of the building, where there was no
basis for finding that the automobile had been in the position that
it was in at the time of the accident for sufficient time that the
owner should have had notice of it. There was no evidence to show
that the dangerous condition was caused by a servant or agent.
In McGrew v. Thompson, 353 Mo. 856, 184 S.W. (2d) 994, it
was held that one is not chargeable with negligence in failing to
discover or remedy a defect or danger in his property which has
not existed for a sufficient time to charge him with the duty of
discovering it. And McKellar v. Pendergast, 68 Cal. App. (2d)
485, 156 P. (2d) 950, held that a landlord is only responsible for
not removing a dangerous foreign substance brought upon the
premises by others if the landlord actually knew of the presence
of such substance, or if it had been present for a sufficient length
of time that he should have known thereof.
Also as to transitory dangers created by the tenants or others
such as articles left on the stairs, it was held that the lessor is liable only where he has notice of the condition, or where it has continued for so long that he is chargeable with negligence in failing
to remove it. Inglehardt Q. Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N. W. 808
(1914).
These latter two cases would only be applicable if the word
"others" could be construed to include a servant or agent. However, from the cases it is not clear that the word could be interpreted or extended since under the doctrine of respondeat superior
it would then be the equivalent of the lessor or landlord having
created the dangerous condition himself. Since the rules of these
cases include "the lessor is liable only where he has notice," it
would appear quite obvious that it would not apply to an agent
or servant since there would then be no question of the lessor being
charged with notice.
6Restatement of Agency, Section 243.
'Ibid, Section 1c.
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This holding appears to be consistent with the current trend
of broadening insurance and security programs. And on the basis
of public policy it would appear that this decision is sound. The
law as developed in this case will tend to lessen the number of
such incidents and accidents by inducing employers to better
choose, instruct, and supervise their employees in performance of
their duties and obligations so as to safeguard the public as well
as to secure their own purses.
RUSSELL C. GUMMIN.
TAXATION: The Use of the Net Worth Theory in Criminal
Prosecutions for Income Tax Evasion.-Recently, on December 6,
1954, the United States Supreme Court announced its decisions
in four companion cases, all of them involving prosecutions for
evasion of Federal income taxes. Notably, there was a dissent
(without opinion) in only one of the four decisions, the other
three were unanimous; in each instance the taxpayer's conviction
was affirmed; and, most important, the net worth approach, when
properly substantiated, was confirmed as a method of proof.
The leading case of the four was Holland v. United States,
-----U.S. ...... 99 L. ed. (Advance p. 127), 75 S.Ct. 127. In it, Mr.
Justice Clark, who wrote all four of the opinions, took the occasion to discuss the net worth method, and to define the limits of
its use. The prosecution was, of course, the United States; the
defendants, husband and wife, were the proprietors of a restaurant
in Golden, Colorado. The defendant taxpayers were convicted of
evading taxes on their 1948 income. The charge was under Section 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code then in effect which
provided penalties for any person who wilfully failed to account
truthfully for and pay taxes due. This section is carried over
into the 1954 Code as Section 7202. Specifically, the charge was
that while the taxpayers reported a tax liability of $1,532.52 on
income of $11,211.42, in truth and in fact, their actual taxable
income was $29,948.16 upon which the tax liability was $7,518.88.
The Government sustained the burden of proof necessary to convict by showing that the taxpayers' net worth resulting from taxable income had increased in amounts greater than those reflected
in their tax returns.
Net worth, in a deceptively simple definition, is net assets,
i.e., excess of assets over liabilities. The Government, in tax evasion prosecutions, endeavors to establish a definite net worth of
the taxpayer at a certain date, the date being the beginning of the
prosecution period. Similarly, a net worth figure must be established at the end of the prosecution period. To the difference between these two amounts is added the taxpayer's nondeductible
expenses. If this sum is greater than the taxable income reported
by the taxpayer, the Government will contend that the excess is
unreported taxable income. That is, it will so contend if the excess
is not explainable otherwise. The brevity of the foregoing is dissembling, and will be expanded upon later.
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This method proof is not new, and first came into prominence
in Capone v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 609. The story is told that
then-President Hoover was outraged by the continued existenceat-large of notorious gangsters, and was insistent that these men
be brought to account in some manner. As a result of its seeming
inability to succeed with criminal prosecution in any other manner, the Government fell back upon income tax evasion with the
resultant well-known success. The fact that gangsters of that era
did not keep accounting records plus the taciturnity of available
witnesses forced the prosecution to proceed on the basis that the
defendant was living in a manner not consistent with his reported
means. Thus, the net worth theory.
For a number of years, it was used only in cases where the
deficiencies were obviously large, and where no records were kept.
Coincident, however, with the increased tax rates of recent years
was the increase in tax evasion. This dissonant concomitant was
met, naturally, with increased governmental activity against the
evaders, and with an increased use of the net worth method as a
basis of proof. Because of this increased use even where the
alleged deficiency was comparatively small and where accounting
records had been maintained, the Supreme Court utilized the Holland case for "a consideration of the entire theory."
The starting point in the Holland case was the Government
computation of the taxpayers' net worth to be some $19,000 on
January 1, 1946. Three years later, the Government computed
their net worth, based on proven purchases and investments of
record, to be $142,300, an increase of $113,300. For the same
period of time, the taxpayers reported only $31,300 on their tax
returns. The indictment contained three counts of evasion, one
for each of the three years from 1946 to 1948; the jury acquitted
on the first two, and convicted on the third. In answer to the
contention that the excess was unreported taxable income, defendants replied that the Government's net worth statement was inaccurate, that it failed to include an accumulation of cash of $113,000, that it failed to include all of the taxpayers' stockholdings,
and that the taxpayers' actual opening net worth was $1.57,000.
Clearly cnough, if the taxpayer cannot show that increases in net
worth are from nontaxable sources such as gifts, loans or inheritances, then it must be shown that the Government's opening net
worth figure is far too low.
The defense with respect to the stockholdings was disposed
of easily cnough. Stock valued at $29,650 had been included in
gross assets and stock of that same value was reported sold on
the 1946 return; thereafter, no other stock transactions nor dividend receipts were shown on any returns. in addition, the defendant-husband had told an agent that he had not dealt in stocks
since 1946. The accumulation of cash was a different matter, however, and a summary of the Government's proof is some indication of the tremendous amount of work necessary in the preparation of these cases. First, a review of the defendants' income tax
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records back to 1913 showed either no taxable income or nominal
amounts during the period over which the accumulation of cash
was claimed to have been made. Second, an extensive survey was
made of the defendants' business record. This survey showed an
unsuccessful business experience: taxpayers had failed in the
cafe business at least once, had never paid $35,000 of debts, had
suffered a default judgment at one time, and for one period of
eight years had separated because it was to their "economical
advantage." All this had happened during the supposed building
up of the cash hoard, and, of courn-e, was completely at variance
with that claim.
A distinguishing feature of ta:. evasion cas;s based on changes
in net worth is that the evidence is indirect, inferential. This is
not surprising when it is realized that the most likely and direct
source of information is the reluctant taxpayer himself. In the
trial court, Judge Ritter aptly characterized these prosecutions
when he informed the jury that the Government's case was made
up of "little bits of circumstantial evidence." Successful prosecution is predicated on presenting sufficient of these "little bits"
which, when logically connected, will permit the jury to draw but
one inference.
The Government's case is basically proving that some tax was
due but that the liability was not reported nor was the tax paid.'
It needn't prove the exact sum of tax evaded, only that a substantial portion was evaded. 2 Fraud is not an element of the crime;
it is not necessary for the Government to show that it has been
misled or that it has relied on some affirmative act of the taxpayer.3
It is the taxpayers' duty to refrain from affirmative evasive acts;
the breach of that duty results in the felony. However, the statute
refers to a "wilful attempt" which must be proved by showing
that the taxpayer was aware of his legal duty when he committed
the act of evasion. In an earlier case, United States v. Murdock,
(1933) 4 the Supreme Court denoted a wilful act as an act done
with bad purpose, perversely. More recently, in Spies v. United
States, (1943) 5 a wilful attempt was said to be one resulting from
conduct the likely effect of which was to mislead or to conceal. Circumstantial evidence of wilfullness has been held to suffice.'
It was against this background of indirection and inference
that the Supreme Court discussed the Holland case. Reiterating
that "the prosecution must always prove the criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt," the Court proceeded to point out "pitfalls" which required "the exercise of great care and restraint"
on the Government's part. These pitfalls were, in essence, guides
to be used for the protection of innocent taxpayers as well as for
'U.S. v. Schenck, 126 F. (2d) 702. cert. denied, 316 U.S. 705.
U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503.
1U.S. v. Schartc,n, 285 U.S. 518.
'290 U.S. 389.
317 U.S. 492.
Battjes v. U.S., 172 F. (2d) 1.
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the prosecution of evaders. The Government was cautioned to
present a case based on detailed examination, one which would
not, even in the least particular, cause the burden of proof to be
shifted to the taxpayer. It is up to the prosecution to negate
effectively the taxpayer's explanations. Further, the Court counseled trial courts that "charges should be especially clear," and
asserted that "appellate courts should review the cases bearing
constantly in mind the difficulties that arise when circumstantial
evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a method that is itself
only an approximation." Even so, taxpayers would do well to
remember Mr. Micawber's reminder that when annual expenditure
exceeds annual income the result is misery, especially if the excess
is unreported income.
ALEXANDER N.

DAVIDSON.

NEED EITHER SPOUSE BE DOMICILED WITHIN A STATE
FOR THE STATE COURT TO ASSUME JURISDICTION IN
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS ?-It is a generally conceded principle
of our law that a court may not assume jurisdiction, unless both
the plaintiff and the defendant are either residents, or within the
boundaries of, that state. An exception to this general principle
has arisen in the case of divorces: here, if one spouse is domiciled
within the state, courts have concluded that this domicile of one
spouse constitutes enough of a "res" for the courts to assert jurisdiction, regardless of the residence of the other spouse.'
The New York court in the recent case of Zieseniss v. Zieseniss -' interpreted a statute of that state in such a way to extend
this exception to cases where neither spouse is a resident of the
state. The statute involved is § 1147 of New York's Civil Practice
Act,3 which provides:
a husband or a wife may maintain an action
against the other party to the marriage to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage
by reason of the defendant's adultery:
2. Where the parties were married within the state.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she and her husband, the defendant, were married in the State of New York in
1940, and that they had resided therein for a number of years.
In the years of 1948, 1949, 1950, and 1951, however, the husband
ceased to be a resident of New York. There was an entire absence
of any allegation of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's residence or domicile in New York. Nevertheless, the plaintiff sought
to have the court assume jurisdiction by virtue of subsection two
of the above-quoted statute, since the marriage ceremony had been
performed within the State of New York.
The court clearly recognized the problem presented and adRestatement, Conflict of Laws, § 110 and 111.
1205 Misc. 836, 129 NYS 2d 659 (1954).
Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939, Part II, pg. 1770.
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mitted that "jurisdiction rests solely upon the fact that the parties
were married in New York and lived here together for several
years."'4 Realizing this, it decided:
1-The statute does in fact mean what it says, and as long as
the parties are married within the state, the court has jurisdiction
even though neither is a resident at the time of the suit.
2-The statute is not unconstitutional. Not only has it remained upon the statute books for over ninety years without attack,
but it tends to discourage migratory divorces, a goal which public
policy favors. Moreover, the state where the marriage took place
is as interested in the relationship of the husband and the wife as
is the state of their domicile.
3-The marriage alone, without domicile, constitutes a "res"
sufficient to support service by publication upon a non-resident
defendant.
The statute, being unique as it is, has been before the New
York courts five times previously. In the first case, 5 the court sidestepped the question by assuming, without deciding, that domicile
was needed even in face of the statute. The second case 6 took the
same stand that the principal case takes, concluding that the statute
gives the court jurisdiction to annul marriages, regardless of
whether there is domicile or not, and regardless of what legal
force the annulment might have in other states.
The three most recent decisions, 7 however, have held that
domicile of one spouse is a necessity for jurisdiction, § 1147 to the
contrary notwithstanding. In fact, "it would seem contrary to the
public policy of this state as it now exists in matrimonial matters
to allow one of the spouses at some future date to come into the
state and obtain a divorce, merely because the marriage was performed here."
The court in the principal case took notice of these contrary
decisions, but held them to be of little weight since they are, in the
court's opinion, merely statements from judges of what the legislature should have enacted, not what it in fact did enact.
Of more import to the court were several decisions previously
handed down by the United States Supreme Court.
In Atherton v. Atherton 9 the couple was married in New York,
but took up residence in Kentucky. The wife later returned to New
York and filed for divorce, which the husband contested on the
grounds of a previous divorce granted by a Kentucky court. On
appeal from the New York court which granted the divorce, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the wife's
domicile was actually in Kentucky at the time of the Kentucky
Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, supra, pg. 650.
Gray v. Gray, 38 N.E. 301.
Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374, 69 NYS 75 (1901).
'Barber v. Barber, 89 Misc. 519, 151 NYS 1064 (1915); Powell v. Powell, 211
App. Div. 750, 208 NYS 153 (1925); Huneker v. Huneker, 57 NYS 2d 99 (1945).
1 Huneker v. Huneker, supra, pg. 100.
'181 U.S. 155 (1901).
4
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divorce and, quoting Cheeley v. Clatyon,)' that "the courts of the
State of the domicile doubtless have jurisdiction to decree a divorce
in accordance with its laws, for any cause allowed by those laws,
without regard to the place of the marriage.' ;"
Bell v. Bell 12 also involved a decree from the New York court.
In this case, the parties were married in Illinois and took up residence in New York. In defense to a suit brought by the wife in
New York, the husband set up a decree of divorce rendered by a
Pennsylvania court. Both the New York court and the Supreme
Court refused to recognize the Pennsylvania divorce, the Supreme
Court saying, "No valid divorce from the bonds of matrimony can
be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a State in which
neither party is domiciled." ' ' - However, this statement was not
necessary Lo the decision, since a Pennsylvania statute 14 required
a person to be a bona fide resident before the court could assume
jurisdiction.
The parties in Streit-wolf v. Streitwolf 15 were married in New
Jersey, where the wife resided and where she filed for divorce.
The husband pleaded in defense a decree of divorce granted by the
North Dakota court. The New York court refused to recognize the
North Dakota divorce on the grounds that the laws of North Dakota required bona fide domicile as a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court affirmed.
Neither party was a resident of Virginia in Davis v. Davis.'"
However, the divorce granted by the Virginia court was affirmed
by the Supreme Court as both parties submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of that court.
Perhaps the most important of these decisions has been the
one in Williams v. North Carolina.'! The defendant was married
in North Carolina, but went to Nevada to obtain his divorce. While
in Nevada, he remarried and returned to North Carolina. Upon
his return to that state, he was prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation. As a defense, he maintained that by giving full faith and
credit to the divorce decree rendered in Nevada, his cohabitation
was neither unlawful nor bigamous. The defendant could get
neither the North Carolina nor the Supreme Court to recognize the
validity of this defense.
The Supreme Court, using language much broader than was
necessary to a decision on the facts stated:
Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a
divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on

§ 2.

10110 U.S. 701 (1884).
1 Supra, pg. 705.
12181 U.S. 175 (1901).
"Bell v. Bell, supra, pg. 177.
14 Pennsylvania
Statutes; March 13, 1815, c. 109, § 11; May 8, 1854, c. 629,
"0181 U.S. 179 (1901).
"0305 U.S. 32 (1938).
1 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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domicile . . . and since 1789 neither this court nor any
other court in the English-speaking world 11 has questioned it. 19
And, again:
• . . one State can grant a divorce of validity in other
states only if the applicant has a bona fide domicile in the
State of the
court purporting to dissolve a prior legal
20
marriage.
Justice Murphy in a concurring opinion expressed his opinion that
21
the requirement of domicile is not merely a matter of state law.
It is to be observed, however, that the State of Nevada this time
did have a law requiring bona fide domicile as a prerequisite for
the Nevada courts' jurisdiction in such matters.
The New York court in the principal case drew a distinction
between these cases, and the one which was before it, which bounds
on the ingenious. The court pointed out that in all cases where
domicile was said to be a necessity, a statute was involved which
granted jurisdiction only in the cases where this element was
present. Moreover, the court could find no case where a statute,
granting jurisdiction in absence of domicile, had been declared
invalid for this reason.
While it is possible to find cases which have ruled statutes
similar to the one here involved invalid, 2 nevertheless, the importance of the distinction should not be underrated. If the distinction
is declared valid, and domicile will be needed only if a state statute
calls for it, one cannot help but imagine the more "competitive"
states vying for the "trade" of divorces by passing more and more
lenient statutes. If this should be the result, migratory divorces
would seem to be encouraged, contrary to the result wished for by
the court in the present case.
If the distinction is declared to be invalid, persons divorced by
the New York courts under this sub-section may today still be
married to their former spouses, at least as far as the other fortyseven states are concerned. This being so, the questions of the
legitimacy of children, bigamy, settlement of estates, revocation
of wills, and a number of others may be decided entirely contrary
to the wishes or the intentions of the parties concerned.
It would seem that neither of these results should be fostered.
JOHN CRISWELL
18Cf. Besker v. Besker, supra, note 6.
"Supra, note 17, pg. 229.
'o

Supra, note 17, pg. 238.

"Supra, Note 17, pg. 240 et seq. See also, Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14
(1903), which Murphy uses as the foundation for his concurrence.
Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236, 3 ALR 2d 662, (1948).
See also, People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260 (1872); Kegley v.
Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 60 P. 2d 482 (1936); Ainscow v. Alexander, 28 Del.
Ch. 545, 39 A. 2d 54 (1944); Worthington v. Dist. Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230
(1914).
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